It did not take long after the Silicon Valley Bank failure for politicians in Washington to rush to the next available microphone and lament the “loosening of bank regulations”. Instinctively the finger pointing began, and in many quarters ended up in the direction of the prior administration’s policy to generally roll back stringent business regulations and allow free market decisions to govern various industries. Chief among the complainants (no pun intended) was Sen Elizabeth Warren, who emerged out of the 2008 crisis as an architect and advocate for the Wall Street Reform Act and the creation of the vaunted Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ( CFPB), which she briefly directed. Just yesterday in DC’s The Hill publication, Sen Warren was reported as blaming the the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank on Republicans in Congress, which in 2018 helped pass a law to ease bank regulations put in place following the 2008 financial crisis. “No one should be mistaken about what unfolded over the past few days in the U.S. banking system: These recent bank failures are the direct result of leaders in Washington weakening the financial rules,” Warren is quoted as saying. According to The Hill piece, Warren, who voted against the 2018 bank deregulation bill, said that the crises would have been avoided if the banks were required to hold more liquid assets because the bill exempted banks with less than $250 billion in assets from rigorous Fed stress tests. Warren and other Democrats say the old rules could have caught the issues at SVB sooner. Given that politicians generally “never let a crisis go to waste,” many now suspect that the banking industry is about to be slammed with heightened regulatory scrutiny, tighter operational rules, more audits and exams, and larger and very public fines, penalties and consent orders. What does this mean for independent mortgage bankers (IMBs)? It means that they have to get back to the compliance mindset they were frightened into adopting between 2008 and 2018, and before the bottoming out of interest rates led everyone to believe that easy money was here to stay and that self-regulation meant hiring more loan officers. Keep those risk management officers and compliance directors close by folks, we are all in for a bumpy ride on the regulatory

For years notaries have found a profitable source of recurring business handing the witnessing and collection of closing documents at residential mortgage closing transactions.  Whether affiliated with escrow and settlement firms, or hired by law firms and title agencies, notaries have found this work relatively easy and absent any significant supervision, oversight and regulation. That perception is changing with the advent of new third party service provider vetting rules established by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173); commonly referred to as “Dodd-Frank.”

The Dawn Of A New Regulator Has Brought Changes

The CFPB, which has been granted super-regulatory powers answerable only to the Federal Reserve and not Congress has been making headlines for the past few years with its plethora of new financial industry rules designed to prevent another mortgage and banking industry collapse while protecting consumers from financial harm and abusive practices.  In April 2012, the CFPB issued a bulletin (CFPB Bulletin 2012-3, or Bulletin) without much fanfare.  This Bulletin was the precursor for final rules that went into effect in January 2014 requiring all non-bank entities (read mortgage lenders and brokers) to “manage third party service provider relationships.”  This Bulletin has had a significant impact on how real estate closing professionals, including notaries, are conducting business and will only have a greater impact this year.

In relevant part, Bulletin 2012-3 states: “The CFPB recognizes that the use of service providers is often an appropriate business decision for supervised banks and nonbanks. Supervised banks and nonbanks may outsource certain functions to service providers due to resource constraints, use service providers to develop and market additional products or services, or rely on expertise from service providers that would not otherwise be available without significant investment….However, the mere fact that a supervised bank or nonbank enters into a business relationship with a service provider does not absolve the supervised bank or nonbank of responsibility for complying with federal consumer financial law to avoid consumer harm…The CFPB expects supervised banks and nonbanks to have an effective process for managing the risks of service provider relationships. The CFPB will apply these expectations consistently, regardless of whether it is a supervised bank or nonbank that has the relationship with a service provider.”

            What this has meant in the real estate closing industry, for title agents, escrow firms, lawyers and notaries, is that all banks who are in the business of making mortgage loans must develop and implement a program to manage the risk of harm, to them and to consumers, by closing professionals.  This includes notaries who handle the witnessing and collection of important mortgage disclosures and other documents at a residential real estate closing.

Resistance To These Changes Has Not Been Successful

When the Bulletin first came to light and the realization set in that a previously unsupervised profession would now be subject to intense scrutiny there was understandable push-back, mainly by some smaller regional professional associations, though not the National Notary Association.  These organizations stepped up to give cover to their members and make the case that vetting closing professionals was unnecessary for reasons of economic, privacy and competitive disadvantage issues.  Their complaints fell largely on deaf ears as the statistics reflected in FBI reports on mortgage industry fraud showed that escrow and title defalcations were a growing segment of white collar criminal activity.  The FBI estimated that 15% of the $13 billion in mortgage fraud claims in 2013, or nearly $2 billion, were directly attributable to the bad acts of closing professionals (FBI Annual Mortgage Fraud Report, www.fbi.gov/stats-services ).  The potential for losses is much bigger.  In 2013, banks funded 8.5 million residential mortgage transactions, wiring more than $1.4 trillion into the trust accounts of more than 100,000 closing professionals (entities and individuals) nationwide (www.MortgageBankers.org; www.corelogic.com, www.realtor.org).

The CFPB Bulletin should not have been a surprise to anyone.  In fact when the author of this article met with the CFPB in 2012, just after the Bulletin was released, he was told that regulators were merely extending to non-bank lenders (not just those federally regulated) the same rules that had been in place for a decade under the OCC for supervised entities, albeit not often enforced.  Indeed, the OCC (and others) had adopted aggressive vendor management rules as far back as 2001 (OCC-2001-47, November 2001; see also Fannie Mae Customer Education Group, Report of December 2005, NCUA Guidance Letter 07-CU-13, December 2007), requiring closing professionals to be vetted.  In response, warehouse banks and some large retail lenders had adopted a modicum of pre-funding vetting requirements that included asking attorneys and other settlement agents to produce proof of insurance and evidence of a trust account, but the implementation was not uniform and neither was the result.  Indeed, the period 2007-2012 saw dozens of defalcations involving escrow agents, title agents, attorneys and notaries who stole mortgage proceeds, falsified documents, hid undisclosed intervening flip transactions, or conspired with others to commit other forms of mortgage fraud.

Banks Must Comply or Face Stiff Penalties

The issuance of CFPB Bulletin 2012-3 essentially inaugurated a new era in third party service provider management to the extent that the federal government, through the CFPB, HUD, OCC, FDIC and others agencies, now has an enforceable expectation that attorneys and other settlement agents must be (a) vetted for risk, (b) monitored for changes in risk, (c) verified to be in compliance with consumer protection statutes, and (d) maintained in a database for examination in the event of an audit.  Failure to comply can result in fines, penalties and even injunctive action against banks.

But it is not just the CFPB Bulletin that is making banks nervous about their settlement agents: It is also the realization that the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338), which addresses the need to manage access to consumers private information, is also looming over their heads because the CFPB is now in charge of enforcing that law as well.  Notaries who appear at the closing table routinely have access to a borrower’s complete personal and financial history, usually contained in the closing documents, especially the RESPA Form 1003 mortgage application.  The 1003 sets forth a consumer’s identity information (including SSN), address, workplace history, bank, and asset information.  Other closing documents may detail family relationships, marriage and divorce information, and similar personal data.

It is indisputable that, when compared to attorneys and title agents, notaries are generally the least educated, trained, and supervised group. Even with the best intentions, state notary licensing bodies are largely reactionary to notary malpractice and criminal behavior.  They simply do not have the technology, labor force and resources to engage in the type of ongoing risk evaluation and reporting that the government expects to ensure proper consumer protection.  Likewise the National Notary Association has the desire but not the resources to manage the actions of thousands of closing notaries nationwide.

Vetting Is Nothing More Than A Vendor Management Process

In an effort to fill the void, vendor management companies are thriving.  These entities specialize in conducting background checks, verifying credentials and experience, reviewing insurance and bond coverage, and generally assisting lenders in meeting these new regulatory requirements.  For years they have established the bar for many vendors to access business at large national and international corporations (the author’s company recently entered the second month of a grueling vendor approval process for a national bank). Notaries who have previously never even thought about “vetting” are suddenly being told that they cannot attend a closing and handle a bank’s documents unless they submit their business and personal information to be screened and verified.  Some are complying, some are complaining and many have yet to experience this new process.  And while there are legitimate concerns about vetting firms, such as data security and privacy, fairness in risk evaluation, and expectations about what is required to be “approved,” the issue is not going away.

What About The CPL?

Historically those suffering losses from closing professional fraud have mainly relied upon the title industry’s “closing protection letter” also know in some states as an “insured closing letter.”  This form of warranty, which is not an insurance product, has been source of conflict with lenders and consumers for years because of its limits and the high costs frequently incurred to litigate coverage and claims issues.  Unfortunately even this limited protection is generally not extended to document witnessing professionals as they are usually not considered the “settlement agent” handling mortgage proceeds.  In any event the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, in conjunction with the title industry and banks, is seeking a better method than the CPL to cover banks and consumers for escrow and closing losses.  Vetting and vendor management just may be the type of underwriting foundation that could encourage property and casualty insurers to come up with a better product.  That may mean lower E&O and bond costs for notaries and better protections for consumers too.

What You Can Expect

There is no question that the CFPB Bulletin 2012-3 covers notaries who witness documents, attend the closing and interact with consumers, and have access to sensitive and personal financial closing documents in connection with residential real estate transactions.  There is no exemption for notaries performing these functions nor does state licensing satisfy the CFPB mandate for banks to act on their own to verify third party risk to consumers.  Lenders must comply with these vendor management rules or face unacceptable risks.  Accordingly since the January 2014 CFPB final rule deadline, more and more banks have been adopting vendor management policies and requesting that notaries submit to vetting processes to meet regulatory expectations.  These processes may be internal to the bank, or they may be outsourced to third party vendor management firms such as the one we operate.

Vendor risk management programs will likely require notaries to submit information sufficient to verify (a) individual identity, (b) corporate or business status, (c) criminal and civil litigation history, (d) licensing and licensing disciplinary history, (e) internal operating controls regarding data privacy and security and consumer protection, and (f) insurance and bond coverage (as applicable by state requirement or lender requirement).  This information will be evaluated for risk (i.e. derogatory findings) and be subject to ongoing monitoring requirements.

In the end, the old way of doing business as a mortgage closing notary is changing and changing fast.  There are good reasons for these changes, and notaries are encouraged to study the applicable regulations and statutes so that they can better understand why they may be asked to become “vetted” before they attend their next residential real estate closing.